A Netflix documentary “The Great Hack” explores how a data company called Cambridge Analytica came to symbolize the dark side of social media in the wake of the 2016 U.S. presidential elections and its involvement with the Leave.EU campaign by the Brexit Party in the U.K. The power of social media companies such as Facebook and the abuse of its data by companies seems to be growing. As a consequence, Facebook recently created a Facebook Supreme Court. Apparently, Facebook must create their own mechanisms of self-regulation. One might even ask if social media companies now have the power of governance?1 This makes me wonder … where are our governments that should be promoting and protecting democratic principles? Yes, also on social media. In this article I will briefly examine the remarkable rise of Forum for Democracy (Fvd), a conservative, right-wing populist, Eurosceptic political party in The Netherlands. Throughout this article I will argue that FvD has most successfully bought their political power and influence through social media by running its lie machine most effective. This is problematic because these lie machines generate false explanations that seem to fit the facts, erode trust in institutions, and abuse the ability to shape behavior for profit or power based entirely on self-authorization with no democratic or moral legitimacy. Finally, this article concludes by stating that using weapons-grade communications tactics, such as micro targeting groups with political propaganda through social media in elections, has become the new normal. Even in a Western European democratic country like The Netherlands.
The rise of the lie machine(s)
FvD was founded in late 2016. The party first participated in 2017, winning their first two seats out of 150 seats in the House of Representatives. But in the 2019 provincial elections, FvD won the most number of seats. A staggering 86 seats out of 570 in total. What explains this success? It is their use of social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and their ability to exploit micro targeting better than other political parties. A quick analysis in a Facebook Ad Library data set clearly shows the numbers.2
I have filtered the data set on ads in The Netherlands and on descending order of amount spent. I have excluded campaigns that cost less than 5,000 Eur. FvD spent a significant amount more than Socialist Party (SP), the number two on the list. FvD spent almost 32 times more than Party for the Animals (PvdD). Leading up to the provincial elections in 2019, it is stated by insiders that approximately 2 million was expended on ads through social media, including Facebook.3
This is problematic because such micro targeting is basically political propaganda organized as lie machines. As Howard explains: “Lie machines are large, complex mechanisms made up of people, organizations, and social media algorithms that generate theories to fit a few facts, while leaving you with a crazy conclusion easily undermined by accurate information. By manipulating data (often illegitimately harvest, bought or stolen) and algorithms in the service of a political agenda, the best lie machines generate false explanations that seem to fit the facts”.4
Lie machines consists out of three main components:
Producer of lies that serve and ideology or the interests of political elites; the producer of lies in this case is the political party FvD itself.
Distributor of lies; the distributor of lies in this case is social media such as Facebook.
Marketer of political lies; the marketer of political lies concerns him or herself with the manipulating of the lies to an individual based on micro targeting.
This tailored political propaganda leads to the creation of lies with text, videos and images that is specifically targeted to a micro group based on privacy invading parameters that are somehow obtained by the marketer.5 By handing out all our data that contains our thoughts, emotions and preference for free to “connect with our friends and family”, Facebook is able to monetize this data as a commodity. This commodity is of high value for commercial organizations to sell their products or services. Recently, dictators in fragile states or political parties in democratic societies seem to tag along in their quest to retain or obtain power and influence. The lie machines no longer are participating in a public debate for different audiences against opponents with different views on societal issues that will challenge the ideology of a political party. Instead, the debate is now highly dispersed through several social media platforms. A level playing field for politicians to pitch their ideas to potential voters and defend their views on societal issues is become less important. Instead, the lie machine goes directly to their audience based on micro targeting. This is problematic for a democratic society. The Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations is working on a new law for political parties to tackle his problem.6 The law will contain rules for financing a political party and how a party shall be organized and on top of that will it try to restrain uncontrolled digital campaigning such as micro targeting via social media platforms. Zuboff, the author of “The Age of Surveillance Capitalism” has this to say about such practices: “The power to shape behaviour for others’ profit or power is entirely self-authorising. It has no foundation in democratic or moral legitimacy”.7
A final remark on buying political power through Facebook by gearing up sophisticated lie machines that occasionally cross ethical borders, relates to something even more obscure. Lie machines tactics employed such as Cambridge Analytica and FvD are not as innocent as they might seem at first sight. “So what they are using my personal data to micro target me with a personalized message?”. Well first of all, it is not an ad to buy toothpaste because you googled something or liked a certain Facebook page. It is about our democracy and its political parties to which we transfer our public voice to in order to represent our interests. Should we transfer our voice through this commercialization of personalized political ads based on a digital profile to the selection of our potential new Prime Minister? Secondly, the methodology used by lie machines via large data sets and micro targeting campaign ads with cleverly crafted different messages by the same political party is considered “a weapon, weapons-grade communications tactics, which means that we had to tell the British government if it was going to be deployed in another country outside the United Kingdom”8 Apparently, it has become the new normal to deploy such tactics on our own citizens and it is tolerated. Although more attention has been given to these practices with means to control the current unlimited and yet uncharted ground to win the “hearts and minds” of voters. By any means necessary, apparently.
In this research paper, the cyber operation “Beebus” will be analyzed
by using strategic, technical and (military-) operational perspectives.
A conceptual model will be applied in order to operationalize military
cyber operations like operation Beebus in relation to fighting power.
Furthermore, operation Beebus will serve as a case study to highlight
various perspectives and academic debates on cyberwarfare. Finally, this
research paper will present an evaluation on how this operation may
contribute to a government’s cyber capabilities and the effectiveness of
operation Beebus, and suggests countermeasures.
“China’s slow, incremental march toward a cutting-edge air force quietly continues”. The development of drone technology serves two purposes for China. First, as a lucrative export product. Second, as a defense capability to deter adversaries in the South China Sea which is of strategic importance. It is believed that China has been stealing sensitive U.S. drone technology information from at least 20 defense contractors for more than two years. In 2013, an U.S. network security company FireEye, Inc. has discovered this Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) campaign consistently targeting companies in the aerospace and defense industries related to drone technology. This research paper will analyze operation Beebus and is structured in three sections. The first section will provide a comprehensive analysis of the operation based on the conceptual model for operationalizing military cyber operations in relation to fighting power by Ducheine and van Haaster (2014). The second section will introduce various perspectives and academic debates regarding military cyber operations like operation Beebus and cyberwar in general. The third section will provide an evaluation how a military cyber operation like Beebus may contribute to a nation-state’s cyber capabilities and how it threatens a nation-state’s interest and suggests countermeasures.
Section 1: Analyzing Operation Beebus
In this section operation Beebus will be analyzed based on the
conceptual model for cyber operations in relation to fighting power. In
order to understand the context of cyber operations like operation
Beebus, the following definition of cyber war is adopted (Shakarian,
Shakarian, & Ruef, 2013, p. 2): “Cyber war is an extension of policy
by actions taken in cyber space by state or non-state actors that
either constitute a serious threat to a nation’s security or are
conducted in response to a perceived threat against a nation’s
security”. By clarifying the definition of cyber war it is emphasized in
this research paper that cyber war is different from cyber security in
general because of the reference to a serious threat to a nation’s
security. This implies an explicit role for the armed forces. A malware
on an individual user’s laptop to steal credit card details or the
infiltration of a corporate network to steal intellectual property can
be a nuisance but is not part of cyber warfare. However, when the
individual is targeted because he or she is a high ranking government
official or when the corporate network is a closed network containing
classified information it can be a matter of national security indeed.
Operation Beebus specifically targeted individual and companies with
access to drone technology in order to boost the drones capability
development of a certain country. The operation is considered an APT
campaign that lasted at least two years. APT processes require a high
degree of covertness over a long period of time with the use of
sophisticated techniques, an external command control server for
continuously monitoring and extracting data, and the direct human
involvement in orchestrating the attack (Musa, 2014). Furthermore, in
this research paper military cyber operations are defined as (Ducheine
& van Haaster, 2014, p. 313): “The employment of cyber capabilities
with the prime purpose of achieving military objectives in or by the use
of cyberspace”. The following conceptual model to analyze military
cyber operations related to fighting power will be used (see figure 1).
Figure 1: Fighting Power and Cyber Operations. Adapted from Ducheine & van Haaster (2014).
Intelligence suggests that a group called ‘Comment Crew’ is behind the operation and it is believed to be a state-sponsored hacker group. The fact that drone technology is the targeted asset aligns with the recent signs of the growing ambitions of China’s drone capability development program. However, it cannot be proven for sure that this operation has been ordered by the Chinese government. This problem is related to the question of attribution. Nevertheless, by analyzing operation Beebus it will seem likely that this was a state-sponsored (military) cyber operation by the Chinese government. A security analyst has to identify basically three things when examining a cyber operation; origin, structure, and purpose (Shakarian, Shakarian, & Ruef, 2013, p. 4). Throughout this research paper the attribution question will be answered, although not definitely. However, another problem arises because of the question of deception. Whenever an attribution is assumed, the possibility of an adversary using deception, the “deception hypothesis” must be considered. Thus, the likelihood that several pieces of intelligence are accurate and feasible (attribution), it can be established whether the deception thesis should be applied by asking the right questions such as “Does organization Z have the capability conduct operation X”, “Does organization Z have a reason to conduct operation X”, “How likely is it that organization Z would have left intelligence Y indicating its responsibilities?”, “Is there another organization Q that has the capability to conduct operation X?” and so on and so forth. Nevertheless, analyzing a cyber operation and its findings cannot provide real hard evidence but this is out of the scope of this research paper.
Operation Beebus is believed to be conducted by the “Comment Crew”
and related to the “Shanghai Group” which is allegedly part of China’s
People Liberation Army (PLA). The Comment Crew is known for placing
encrypted HTML comments embedded in benign websites, transforming them
into malicious websites. During operation Beebus, companies in the
aerospace and defence industries, and academia have been consistently
targeted for gathering research design and manufacturing details of the
latest U.S. drone technologies. Furthermore, the malware used was
socially engineered and constructed in documents and whitepapers related
to South Asian military affairs and international relations. If it is
assumed that the Chinese government is in some way involved in operation
Beebus it could be argued that the following instruments and components
of power have been used. Betz & Stevens (2011, pp. 45-53) propose
four distinct forms of cyber-power which are; compulsory, institutional,
structural, and productive. Hence; “Cyber-power is therefore the
manifestation of power in cyberspace rather than a new or different form
of power” (Ibid, p 44).
This research paper identifies the direct and indirect use of all four distinct forms of cyber-power. Namely, compulsory power has been applied through coercive action and control over the behavior humans and computers in order to steal drone technology which could potentially be used against U.S. national security interests. Second, institutional power is used to indirectly control an actor through the mediation of formal and informal institutions. China’s efforts to approve a Russian-drafted agreement in the international system, in 2009, based on certain rules and norms on behavior in cyberspace by nation-states in favor of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) members is an example of a coordinated institutional power instrument.   Third, structural power has been applied via operation Beebus because it has the potential to disrupt the status quo in the international system where currently the U.S. is considered as the global superpower. China might seek to disrupt this status quo by gathering and collecting crucial U.S. drone technology for its own interests. Specializing in conducting covert military cyber operations which are difficult to attribute does seem as a powerful instrument to disrupt the status quo. Fourth, productive power is used through a mediated discourse by and enacted in cyberspace to facilitate and constrain social action. China released reports and statements countering U.S. claims with their own charges of cyber-espionage conducted by the U.S. By doing so, China might strive to persuade non friendly nation states towards the U.S. and tip the mediated discourse balance in favor of China.
It is difficult to assign operation Beebus into a single threat
category in relation to national security mandates. It is also important
to understand that national cyber security is not one single subject
area. The following five distinct mandates are mentioned by Klimburg and
Mirtl (2012) which are: Military cyberactivities; counter-cybercrime;
intelligence and counter-intelligence; critical infrastructure
protection and national crisis management; and cyberdiplomacy and
internet governance. Operation Beebus has elements of social engineering
e.g. the ‘weaponized’ pdf files with specific titles to spur interest
of a target. Also, there is the stealing of intellectual property and
espionage. The operational Technique, Tactic and Procedure (TTP) applied
in operation Beebus is spear-phishing. Socially engineered emails with
pdf attachments in the form of documents and reports by well-known
companies such as Boeing and KPMG and white papers with titles such as
“Pakistan’s Indigenous UAV Industry” were sent to persons of interest.
The technical TTP applied is modifying pdf files using Ghostscript in
order to infect users with malware using a well-document vulnerability
known as DLL search order hijacking. Upon opening the pdf file a DLL
(trojan) is dropped in the C:\\Windows Directory and will persist on the
device. Then, it sends back an initial GET request to a Command and
Control (C&C) server which is traced back to somewhere in China. The
trojan collects information from the computer and sends back encrypted
information in order to avoid detection. However, this C&C server
used a TCP Proxy tool in order to disguise either the true source or
destination of the stolen information traffic. Thus, it is clear to see
that the attribution problem arises and that the deception thesis needs
to be taken into account. Nevertheless, intelligence suggests that the
Chinese government is somehow directly or indirectly involved based on
targeted objects and persons, and the operational and technical TTPs.
But is operation Beebus part of military cyberactivities? In this
research paper it is argued that it is, because in or through cyberspace
military objectives are being achieved. Namely, stealing drone
technology in order to boost the drone capability development program.
Second, information could be used to research and develop TTP on how to
hack the drones of potential enemies via reverse engineering and finding
the exploits in a Cyber-Physical System (CPS) like drones. Finally, the
effect of such an operation increases distrust and forces countries
like the U.S. and China to engage in cyberdiplomacy. Thus, the
components related to fighting power which are affected by this
operation are physical, moral, and conceptual (Ducheine & van
Haaster, 2014, p. 305). First, the equipment and the confidentiality,
integrity and confidentiality has been compromised. China has procured
and manufactured a drone, Wing Loong, that is very similar to the U.S.
drone, Predator, but produces and sells its drone for much cheaper than
the U.S. version. Second, the moral component of fighting power has been
affected because this operation has raised doubts on what the Chinese
government knows about U.S. manufactured drones and what they can do
with this information. Third, the conceptual component has been affected
that should lead to certain training and education for drone operators
in order to raise awareness about the possibility that drones contain
vulnerabilities and can be exploited by a willing and capable adversary.
But is operation Beebus an act of cyberwar? When a cyber operation
constitutes a significant threat to a nation’s security, it can be
considered an act of cyberwar. In the next section several perspectives
and academic debates on cyberwar will be taken into consideration and
applied to operation Beebus.
Section 2: Perspectives and Debates on Cyberwar
In this section various perspectives and academic debates on cyberwar
will be introduced. Cyberwar is a contested and loaded term (Klimburg
& Mirtl, 2012, p. 15). It is argued by Klimburg and Mirtl that a
cyberattack constitutes ‘battlefield cyberwarfare’ if military
cybercapabilities are used only within a clearly defined tactical
military mission. In the case of operation Beebus, the effects are not
limited to the operational-tactical environment. Furthermore, the
emphasis of military cyberactivities can lie on ‘strategic cyberwarfare’
that is the ability to strike at the heart of a nation (Ibid, p 16).
Thus, operation Beebus would not fall under the national cybersecurity
mandate of military cyberactivities but more likely under mandate of
intelligence and counter-intelligence. Although distinguishing the act
of espionage from military activities is not uncontroversial. More
fittingly, discussing cyberwarfare is controversial and creating
separate mandates with separate roles and responsibilities might not be
the best way to properly deal with cyber operations like Beebus.
In 2010, a Chatham House report “On Cyberwarfare” described
cyberspace as ‘terra nullius’ and beyond the reach of a mature political
discourse (Cornish, Livingstone, Clementa, & Yorke). Therefore,
cyberspace is an attractive place for nation-states and non-state actors
to pursue certain goals. The Chinese government is believed to have
embraced cybercapabilities in order to target sensitive information from
a military superior U.S and fits within the doctrine of ‘using
information superiority to achieve greater victories at a smaller cost’
(Cornish, Livingstone, Clementa, & Yorke, 2010, p. 8). It would also
be wise to realize that the strategic and military thinking in China is
not based on writings of the soldier-philosopher Clausewitz or general
Jomini like most advanced Western nations. The Chinese cyber strategy
offers room for cyber espionage campaigns like Beebus (Shakarian,
Shakarian, & Ruef, 2013, pp. 116-117). In the game of Go, the
equivalent for the game of chess, it not the goal to seek the
destruction of pawns in order to capture the king but the goal is to
conquer parts of the game space. Furthermore, one of China’s strategic
objective is to maximize the strategic configuration of power, called
“Shi” which refers to the ability to ensuring a victory over a superior
force and on setting favorable conditions for when a conflict does arise
(Ibid). Hence, operation Beebus fits within the doctrine of using
information superiority, the strategy of conquering parts of cyberspace,
and setting favorable conditions for a future conflict.
Furthermore, setting the battlefield for a game of Go and
establishing Shi in order to conduct military cyber operations is backed
up with the ‘three warfares’ (Shakarian, Shakarian, & Ruef, 2013,
p. 119). These include media which is used to support the righteous
cause of China. Second, the legal justification of this cause and third,
psychological warfare to aide friendly and attack the enemy’s morale.
Even though intelligence suggests that the Chinese government is
responsible for operation Beebus, it would be wise to consider the
possibility of a Reflexive Control (RC) military operation. For Russia,
RC is one the primary methods to interfere with decision-making process
of an enemy commander (Thomas, 2004, p. 237). RC is defined as a means
of conveying an opponent specially prepared information to incline him
to voluntarily make the predetermined decision desired by the initiator
of the action (Ibid). The following describes how computer technology
creates new opportunities to RC: “In present conditions, there is a need
to act not only against people but also against technical
reconnaissance assets and especially weapons guidance systems, which are
impassive in assessing what is occurring and do not perceive to what a
person reacts” (Thomas, 2004, p. 247). Through RC, Russia could be
applying a form a ‘perception’ management through the control of cyber
operations like Beebus in order to distract, paralyze, deceit or provoke
the U.S. government in engaging a long and costly cyber war.
Regarding the likelihood of cyber warfare, Rid (2012, p. 6) argues
that cyber war does not take place in the present and that it is highly
unlikely that cyber war will occur in the future. Rid considers
cyber-attacks merely as sophisticated versions of subversion, espionage,
and sabotage and not as an act of war because they are non-lethal.
Correspondingly, Libicki (2012, p. 335) argues that the notion of seeing
cyberspace as a warfighting domain that needs to be dominated just like
the other warfighting domains is misleading and pernicious because
superiority cannot be achieved in cyberspace. In contrast, Stone (2013,
p. 107) concludes that cyber-attacks could constitute acts of war if it
becomes clear what is meant by force and violence, and their
relationship with lethality (i.e. kinetic impact). In addition, Zetter
(2015) contends that we are already at cyber war and observes that more
than 20 countries like the US, China, UK, Israel, North Korea, Iran and
Russia have built cyber offensive capabilities in the past few years.
Section 3: Evaluating the Effects and Suggested Countermeasures
This research paper concludes with an evaluation how a military cyber
operation like Beebus might contribute to a nation-state’s cyber
capabilities and how it threatens a nation-state’s interest. For the
sake of arguments, it is now assumed that the Chinese government is
responsible for operation Beebus. But is stealing drone technology cyber
war? It is clear to see that drone technology relates to a nation’s
security. It would be reasonable to categorize this operation as part of
the intelligence and military cyberactivities national cyber security
mandates. According to Applegate (2015, p. 1) there is a: “credible
capability to use cyber attacks to achieve kinetic effects”. The main
targets for kinetic cyber attacks CPS. A CPS is the integration of
computer systems with physical processes such as drones. And like other
information technologies, drones were designed with little security.
Drones are prone to attacks as they are equipped with sensors to process
data and this exposes them to vulnerabilities (Rani, Modares, &
Considering the game of Go, establishing Shi, the possibility of RC
and the exploits to CPS like drones, operation Beebus seems less of an
isolated cyberespionage campaign but indeed part of a coherent cyber
security doctrine and strategy against a nation’s security with
intelligence suggesting that the Chinese government is in some way
involved. Does this mean that operation Beebus is battle in a cyberwar
between China and the U.S? Let us turn back to the definitions used in
this research paper. “Cyber war is an extension of policy by actions
taken in cyber space by state or non-state actors that either constitute
a serious threat to a nation’s security or are conducted in response to
a perceived threat against a nation’s security” (Shakarian, Shakarian,
& Ruef, 2013, p. 2). Operation Beebus can now be considered as an
extension of the Chinese doctrine and strategy against U.S. national
security interests. Also, the definition of military cyber operations
can be applied to Beebus; “The employment of cyber capabilities with the
prime purpose of achieving military objectives in or by the use of
cyberspace” (Ducheine & van Haaster, 2014, p. 313). At first glance,
the operation might fall under the ‘artificial’ national security
mandate of intelligence and counter-intelligence. However, due to the
targeted specific technology related to U.S. drones the operation can
also be considered as part of military cyberactivities. It all depends
on which perspective is applied when interpreting a cyber operation.
In its most basic form operation Beebus is a spear-phishing campaign
designed to be highly personalized therefore hitting the human weak
spots (Parmar, 2012). Employees of drone technology companies regularly
open and reply to emails on the move. The cause of this is the
proliferation of mobile devices. To counter the threats from operations
like Beebus, organizations need to increase awareness of spear-phishing
and educate on how to avoid cyber-fraud (Ibid, p 10). Blacklisting
certain Internet Protocol (IP) addresses could be a solution but easily
bypassed. Therefore, a layered protection strategy, or ‘defence in
depth’ should be applied. Instead of blacklisting, IT managers should
whitelist exactly which programs should be permitted to run and does not
depend on updates from anti-virus programs. Also, a method for
restoring systems to their original setting should be made available at
every computer and mobile device containing sensitive information.
China’s drone capability development program has been steadily
growing the past five years. Intelligence suggests that the Chinese
government is responsible for operation Beebus although this paper does
not provide any hard evidence. The operation is an APT campaign that
lasted for at least two years. In this research paper is it argued that
cyber war is an extension of policy by action taken in cyber space by
state or non-state actors that constitutes a serious threat to another
nation’s security. A conceptual model for analyzing military cyber
operations related to fighting power has been used to interpret the
operation. The problem of attribution and the possibility of deception
has been introduced and it is stated that there cannot be any real hard
evidence for the claim that China is indeed responsible. Nevertheless,
forms of cyber-power have been found which are applied via operation
Beebus. Drone technology is stolen, indirect control over U.S. is
applied, the status quo is indirectly challenged if China ought to be
the number one drone manufacturer in the next ten years, and China
released reports and statements countering U.S. claims with their own
charges of cyber-espionage conducted by the U.S. government. Operation
Beebus can be considered as part of the intelligence and
counter-intelligence, and the military cyberactivities national cyber
security mandate because of its relation to U.S. national security
interests. The operational and technical TTP’s of the operation
indicates direct human orchestration. Because cyberspace is still beyond
the reach of a mature political discourse, it is an attractive place
for pursuing military goals for rising powers such as China to challenge
U.S. hegemony. The Chinese cyber strategy and doctrine provides
sufficient possibilities to engage the U.S. via cyber operations like
Beebus. Operation Beebus fits within the doctrine of using information
superiority, the strategy of conquering parts of cyberspace, and setting
favorable conditions for a future conflict. Stealing drone technology
alone does not directly indicate serious threats to a nation’s security.
Therefore, the credible capability to use cyber attacks to achieve
kinetic effects is also mentioned. Drones are CPS prone to attacks and
exploitation of vulnerabilities. It is thus wise to not only look at the
operation itself but also to consider its context within international
security and the power struggle between nation-states. A layered
protection strategy, or ‘defence in depth’ could be a good
countermeasure against spear-phishing operations like Beebus, this
includes blacklisting, whitelisting applications and systems restoring
methods at the touch of a button on any device containing sensitive
Applegate, S. D. (2015). The Dawn of Kinetic Cyber. 5th International Conference on Cyber Conflict. Talinn: NATO CCD COE Publications.
Betz, D. J., & Stevens, T. (2011). Chapter One: Power and Cyberspace. In D. J. Betz, & T. Stevens, Cyberspace And The State (pp. 35-53). Adelphi Series.
Cornish, P., Livingstone, D., Clementa, D., & Yorke, C. (2010). On Cyber Warfare. Chatham House.
Ducheine, P., & van Haaster, J. (2014). Fighting Power, Targeting and Cyber Operations. 6th International Conference on Cyber Conflict. Talinn: NATO CCD COE Publications.
Klimburg, A., & Mirtl, P. (2012). Cyberspace and Governance – A Primer. Austrian Institute for International Affairs.
Libicki, M. C. (2012). Cyberspace Is Not a Warfighting Domain. I/S: a journal of law and policy for the information society, 321-336.
Musa, S. (2014, March). Advanced Persistent Threat. Academia.
Parmar, B. (2012). Protecting against spear-phishing. Comptuter Fraud & Security, 8-11.
Rani, C., Modares, H., & Sriram, R. (2015). Security of unmanned aerial vehicle systems against cyber-physical attacks. Journal of Defense Modeling and Simulation: Applications, Methodology, Technology, 1-12.
Rid, T. (2012). Cyber War Will Not Take Place. Strategic Studies, 5-32.
Shakarian, P., Shakarian, J., & Ruef, A. (2013). Introduction To Cyber-Warfare: A Multidisciplinary Approach. Waltham: Syngress.
Stone, J. (2013). Cyber War Will Take Place! Strategic Studies, 101-108.
Thomas, T. L. (2004). Russia’s Reflexive Control Theory and the Military. Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 237-256.